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The Creation of Transnational 
Administrative Structures 
Governing Internet Communication 
Russell L. Weaver1 
Duncan Fairgrieve2 
Francois Lichere3 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the world becomes more economically integrated, increasing num-
bers of problems arise that are best handled through international treaties and 
transnational regulatory structures.4  For example, there have been concerns 
regarding the safety of products shipped from developing countries.  These 
concerns have involved manufactured products, but have been particularly 
evident with food.5  Numerous examples can be found.  The Japanese “dis-
covered high levels of pesticides in imported spinach,”6 and U.S. “pets died 
from eating [imported] pet food contaminated with toxic chemicals.”7  In 
France, pesticides were discovered in fish imported from Africa, prompting 
the French government to suspend the importation of all fishes from Uganda, 
Kenya and Tanzania.  This suspension was upheld by the French Council of 
State which held that it was impossible to trace the origin of imported fishes, 
and therefore that it was permissible to forbid the importation of all fishes 
from the affected countries.8  Between the U.S. and the European Union, 
  
 1. Professor of Law and Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louis-
ville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law. 
 2. Senior Fellow in Comparative Law, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, and Maître de Conférences, SciencesPo, Paris.  
 3. Professor of Law, University of Aix-Marseille, Faculty of Law. 
 4. See Keith Schneider, Democrats on Senate Panel Attack the Free Trade Pact, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1992, at D2.   
 5. See Russell L. Weaver & Francois Lichere, Protecting Consumers in an Era 
of World Trade, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 105, 106-07 (2009). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. CE, Dec. 29, 1999, Rec. Lebon 206945, available at http://www.legifrance 
.com/affichJuriAdmin.do?oldAction=rechExpJuriAdmin&idTexte=CETATEXT0000
07996586&fastReqId=376098222&fastPos=7.  This decision may be considered the 
first one to refer to traceability at a time where no legislation had imposed it to public 
authorities. 
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there have been disputes regarding U.S. beef laced with natural and synthetic 
hormones.9  
In the modern era, not only does trade flow across international bounda-
ries, so does information.  As traditional media sources (e.g., newspapers, 
radio and television) have been supplemented by the Internet, personal com-
puters (PCs) and various types of handheld devices, more and more people 
are able to freely communicate with others all over the world.10  These in-
creased communication flows have led to numerous problems that might be 
susceptible to transnational administrative regulation and enforcement.  For 
example, Internet communications sometimes contain information that vio-
lates copyright laws,11 or that is simply illegal, including the distribution of 
child pornography12 and propagation of fraudulent schemes.13  The Internet 
has also been used by Internet gambling businesses (which, while perhaps 
legal, can produce significant adverse social consequences), and has provided 
a forum for terrorists to connect with each other and organize concerted ac-
  
 9. See Marc Christopher Kramb, Die Entscheidungen des Dispute Settlement – 
Verfahrens der WTO in Hormonstreit zwischen der EU und den USA – Implikationen 
fur zukunftigen Umgang mit dem SPS – Abkomment, 2001); Barbara Eggers, Die 
Entscheidung des WTO Appellate Body in Hormonfall, 9 EuZW 147 (1998); Chris-
tine Godt, Der Bericht des Appellate Body der WTO zum EG-Einfuhrverbot von 
Hormonfleisch, 9  Regulierung im Weltmarket 2002 (1998); Olivier Brin, La 
Politique Sanitaire de la Communauté Européenne à l’Épreuve des Règles de 
l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce:Le Contentieux des Hormones, Revue Trime-
strielle de Droit Européen, 1999, at 43. 
 10. See Russell L. Weaver, From Gutenberg to the Internet: Free Speech, Ad-
vancing Technology and the Implications for Democracy (2013). 
 11. See, e.g., Copyrights and Internet Piracy (SOPA and PIPA Legislation), N.Y. 
Times, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/copyrights/ 
index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2013). 
 12. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down 
portions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 that prohibited “virtual” 
child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding a New 
York criminal statute that prohibited individuals from knowingly promoting sexual 
performances by children under the age of sixteen). 
 13. See Katie Hafner, With Internet Fraud Up Sharply, EBay Attracts Vigilantes, 
N.Y. Times (Mar. 20, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/20/business/with-
internet-fraud-up-sharply-ebay-attracts-vigilantes,html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
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tion,14 as well as for the propagation of hate speech15 and pedophilia advo-
cacy.16 
In an attempt to deal with these problems, past president Nicolas 
Sarkozy of France has called for more international regulation of the Inter-
net,17 as has German Chancellor Angela Merkel.18  However, effective trans-
national regulation requires the participation of all of the major players, not 
just two countries.  If a major nation or group of nations opts out of a transna-
tional regulatory scheme, the chances for effective regulation are significantly 
reduced.  Given that Internet communications can so easily cross interna-
tional borders, significant gaps in participation may undercut the effective-
ness of regulatory schemes. 
Even though transnational structures may be needed to address problems 
related to the transnational flow of goods and information, nations differ sig-
nificantly in terms of their cultures, legal traditions and constitutional restric-
tions.  These differences can make it difficult to develop transnational agree-
ments and regulatory structures.  In this short Article, we discuss free speech 
obstacles to an effective transnational structure regulating the Internet. 
II. THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES UNDER U.S., FRENCH 
AND ENGLISH LAW 
Regarding Internet regulation, the differing attitudes of countries to-
wards treaties constitutes a major obstacle to effective regulation.  In this 
section, we examine the effect and impact of international treaties under U.S., 
British and French law. 
  
 14. See Dina Temple-Raston, “Jihad Jane” Creates a Calamity for Authorities, 
Nat’l Pub. Radio (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php ?sto-
ryId=124539554. 
 15. See Lauren Streib, Poetic Justice: Kentucky Man Arrested for Threatening 
President with 16-Line Poem, Bus. Insider (Feb. 20, 2010), http://www 
.businessinsider.com/poetic-justice-kentucky-man-arrested-for-threatening-president-
with-16-line-poem-2010-2. 
 16. See Mothers Fight Back Against Pedophile’s Web Site, ABC News (July 30, 
2007), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=3426796&page=1 (noting that 
“McClellan has operated detailed [websites] rating the best public places to watch 
young children at play and posting photos he's taken at events.  He even rated loca-
tions based on how many little girls, or LGs as he call them, are there.”). 
 17. See Eric Pfanner, G-8 Leaders to Call for Tighter Internet Regulation, N.Y. 
Times (May 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/technology/25tech.html. 
 18. See Eric Pfanner, Germany Trying to Cut Publishers In on Web Profits, N.Y. 
Times (Mar. 11, 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/business/global/germany-
trying-to-cut-publishers-in-on-web-profits.html?pagewanted=print. 
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A.  The U.S. Attitude Towards Treaties 
The United States is frequently criticized for its failure to enter into, or 
comply with, international treaties.19  However, it is important to realize that 
the U.S. regards international treaties much differently than do most other 
nations in the world.  Under the United States Constitution, the Constitution 
itself is the supreme law of the land, and any statute or treaty that conflicts 
with the Constitution is invalid.20  Indeed, under U.S. domestic law, a treaty is 
regarded as having only the same status as a statute21 and cannot stand if it is 
not consistent with the U.S. Constitution.22   
The U.S. position on treaties does not preclude all treaties or all interna-
tional regulation.  In fact, in many areas, international cooperation is quite 
possible.  For example, in Missouri v. Holland,23 the Court held that the U.S. 
government could constitutionally enter into a treaty on migratory birds.  In 
De Geofrey v. Riggs,24 the Court upheld a treaty regarding the intestate suc-
cession of real property owned by foreign citizens.  Indeed, there are many 
areas where the U.S. can validly enter into international treaties. 
As a result, while the U.S. may have some freedom to compromise and 
cooperate with other nations on various issues relating to the development of 
transnational regulatory structures governing the Internet, U.S. negotiators 
will need to make sure that they do not run afoul of the Constitution.  Other-
wise, any international treaty or regulatory structure may be unconstitutional 
and unenforceable in the United States. 
  
 19. See Heather M. Heath, Non-Compliance with the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations and Its Effect on Reciprocity for United States Citizens Abroad, 
17 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 2 (2004). 
 20. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). 
 21. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“By the constitution, a 
treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legis-
lation.  Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no 
superior efficacy is given to either over the other.  When the two relate to the same 
subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, 
if that can be done without violating the language of either; but, if the two are incon-
sistent, the one last in date will control the other: provided, always, the stipulation of 
the treaty on the subject is self-executing.”). 
 22. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) (“[N]o agreement with a for-
eign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, 
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution . . . .  It would be manifestly con-
trary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as those who 
were responsible for the Bill of Rights – let alone alien to our entire constitutional 
history and tradition – to construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exer-
cise power under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibi-
tions.  In effect, such construction would permit amendment of that document in a 
manner not sanctioned by Article V.”). 
 23. 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920). 
 24. 133 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1890). 
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B. The Status of Treaties within the UK 
The status of treaties in the United Kingdom is somewhat different. The 
UK is a dualist system, and thus the power to conclude international treaties 
remains within the exercise of the royal prerogative by the Crown’s Minis-
ters.  Since the Crown cannot change the law of the land by virtue of the royal 
prerogative, then a direct corollary is the idea that treaties do not constitute a 
direct source of law in the United Kingdom.25 Therefore, treaties binding on 
the United Kingdom do not themselves have the force of law in English 
courts, and if treaty commitments require changes to UK laws, then legisla-
tion must be enacted to that effect so as to incorporate the treaty into national 
law or otherwise modify national law.26 
Unlike unincorporated treaties, customary international law is a source 
of English law which may be applied by the English courts.27  Treaties may 
nonetheless be an indirect source of law, such as when legislation is passed to 
give effect to their terms.  English courts will increasingly take account of the 
norms of international law, and “the principles of statutory interpretation 
[now] include a presumption that Parliament intends to comply with the 
[UK’s international] obligations,” and therefore “any ambiguity in the statu-
tory language is resolved” in favor of a “meaning that is consistent with treaty 
obligations.”28 
C. The Status of Treaties in France 
France cannot be classified as a dualist system regarding the status of in-
ternational law.29 Certain aspects of the French system suggest that it has a 
dualist system, but other aspects suggest that it is a monist system that gives 
priority to internal sources of law.  Quite often, the case law of the Council of 
State, the supreme administrative Court in France, makes reference to the 
idea that, “in the internal order”, the Constitution must prevail over any other 
source of law, including international treaties.  On the other hand, the French 
constitutions, since 1946,30 provide that treaties and international agreements 
  
 25. See Blackburn v. Attorney General [1971] 1 WLR 1037, 1040-41 (U.K.). 
 26. The legislation should be enacted by virtue of an Act of Parliament or, in 
certain circumstances, delegated legislation.  See id. at 1041. 
 27. See generally Vaughan Lowe, Rules of International Law in English Courts, 
in Tom Bingham and the Transformation of the Law: A Liber Amicorum 451 (Mads 
Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2001). 
 28. J. Beatson et al., Human Rights: Judicial Protection in the United Kingdom, ¶  
1.47 (2d ed. 2008). 
 29. Denys Simon, L’Arrêt “Sarran”: Dualisme Incompressible ou Monisme 
Inversé ?, Europe, Mar. 1999, at 4. 
 30. The Constitution of the Fourth Republic gave this possibility which was 
implemented for the first time by the Conseil d’État in 1952.  See CE Ass., May 30, 
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should have direct effect in French courts, and gives  those documents prece-
dence over statutes if certain conditions are met, including regular ratifica-
tion, regular publicity and the reciprocity principle.  Article 55 of the Consti-
tution provides that “[t]reaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, 
upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, with respect to 
each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party.”31  Indeed, the 
most important treaties must be “ratified” by the President of the Republic, 
which implies a prior authorization by the parliament. The case law addition-
ally provides that the international treaty must be self-executing and that the 
reciprocity condition is inapplicable to humanitarian treaties and to European 
Union treaties.  Article 54 of the Constitution sets the relationships between 
treaties and the Constitution in a way which is not clear cut as to which text 
must have precedence over the other.32  
The majority of commentators interpret this provision as proof of the 
superiority of the Constitution since there is no real duty to amend the Consti-
tution when it conflicts with a treaty.  These two provisions are compatible 
with the idea of a monist system with a priority to internal sources.  This su-
preme internal source is quite obvious for article 54 but also for article 55: it 
is the French Constitution, i.e. an internal source, which gives priority to an 
international source of law over Acts of Parliament.  
The superiority of the Constitution over international treaties is now 
very relative when it comes to European Union law which is often presented 
as “integrated” in the French system.  The current state of law is an interest-
ing attempt to conciliate the superiority of the Constitution and the principle 
of the primacy of European Union law developed by the European Court of 
Justice, although the case law first suggested that the Constitution was supe-
rior to EU law.33  One could argue that this system could be taken as an ex-
ample for other countries which are not part of such an integrated system.  
The Constitutional Court, the French supreme constitutional court, was 
asked to control the conformation of a statute with the  Constitution as pro-
vided by an European directive, and an act from European institutions that the 
member states shall implement in their own legislation.  After having decided 
that it cannot exercise control over laws unless they are contrary to an express 
  
1952, Rec. Lebon 231 (Fr.).  The Constitution of the Fifth Republic, still in force, 
adopted the same provision.  See 1958 Const. 55 (Fr.). 
 31. 1958 Const. 55, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/english/constitution/constitution-of-4-October-1958.25742.html #Ti-
tleVI (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
 32. Id. at art. 54. (“If the Constitutional Council, on a referral from the President 
of the Republic, from the Prime Minister, from the President of one or the other 
Houses, or from sixty Members of the National Assembly or sixty Senators, has held 
that an international undertaking contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, 
authorization to ratify or approve the international undertaking involved may be given 
only after amending the Constitution”). 
 33. See CE, Dec. 3, 2001, Rec. Lebon 624 (Fr.). 
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provision of the Constitution,34 it changed the formulation to allow itself to 
exercise control over directives that are contrary to the “French constitutional 
identity”.35  As a commentator put it, the Constitutional Court switched from 
an ambiguous formula to an obscure formula.36  
Fortunately, the Council of State (“Conseil d’Etat”), the French supreme 
administrative Court, decided to adopt the same conciliatory spirit but with a 
formula that seems to be more consistent with a practical approach.  The most 
famous ruling was handed down on February 8, 2007.37  The appellant, the 
company Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine, was seeking annulment of a decree 
transposing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse-gas emission-allowance trad-
ing within the European Union.38  It claimed that the decree had failed to 
respect various constitutional principles, specifically the principle of equal 
treatment.39  The Council of State was faced with a conflict between the su-
premacy of the Constitution under the French legal system and the obliga-
tions on France arising from its membership of the European Union and the 
European Union, this membership being included in the French Constitution 
since 1992.40   
The Council of State decided that from then on, any conflict between 
EU law and the French Constitution should be resolved through a dual proc-
ess.41  First, the court resolving the dispute must establish whether a national 
constitutional principle has an equivalent principle within the European Un-
ion legal system by taking account the European treaties but also the way 
they are interpreted by the European Court of Justice.42  Where such an 
equivalent principle is present, it is the responsibility of the administrative 
court either to set aside the argument cited if not relevant or, in the case of a 
serious difficulty, to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice as to its validity.43  Second, if the national court cannot 
establish within the European Union law a general principle equivalent to the 
  
 34. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2004-
496DC, June 10, 2004, Rec. 7 (Fr.). 
 35. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2006-
540DC, July 27, 2006, Rec. 19 (Fr.). 
 36. Denys Simon, L'Obscure Clarté de la Jurisprudence du Conseil Constitution-
nel Relative à la Transposition des Directives Communautaires, Europe, Oct. 2006, at 
2-3. 
 37. CE Ass., Feb. 8, 2007, Rec. Lebon  55 (Fr.) (English translation available at 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62007CJ0127:EN:HTML). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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constitutional principle cited, national courts have to investigate directly the 
constitutionality of the disputed provisions.44  In the case, the Council of State 
found that the principles of freedom of enterprises (“Liberté d’entreprendre”) 
and of equal treatment had equivalents in EU law.45  Regarding the first prin-
ciple, it stated that the decree was not in breach of the principle but the Coun-
cil of State had some doubts about the principle of equal treatment since the 
decree excluded from the system some industries that were probably not pol-
luting less than others subject to the regulation transposing the European Di-
rective.46  Eventually, the Court of Justice ruled that there was justification 
for this breach of equal treatment.47   
Although this ruling could be seen as a loss of sovereignty, it is only 
partially so.  There is a loss sovereignty when an administrative court consid-
ers that there is a risk of breach, but the administrative court remains compe-
tent to assess that there is no such risk.  For example, one argument of the 
claimant was that the decree should have discriminated between two different 
economic sectors (namely  steel industries and other industries subject to the 
  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Notably Aluminium and Plastic industries where excluded when Steel indus-
tries were not.  Id. 
 47. Id. § 63-65 (“It should be observed here that, while the legislature could 
lawfully make use of such a step-by-step approach for the introduction of the allow-
ance trading scheme, it is obliged, in particular in view of the objectives of Directive 
2003/87 and of Community policy in the field of the environment, to review the 
measures adopted, inter alia as regards the sectors covered by Directive 2003/87, at 
reasonable intervals, as is moreover provided for in Article 30 of the directive.  How-
ever, as the Advocate General notes inter alia in point 48 of his Opinion, the Commu-
nity legislature’s discretion as regards a step-by-step approach could not, in the light 
of the principle of equal treatment, dispense it from having recourse, for determining 
the sectors it thought suitable for inclusion in the scope of Directive 2003/87 from the 
outset, to objective criteria based on the technical and scientific information available 
at the time of adoption of the directive.  As regards, first, the chemical sector, it may 
be seen from the history of Directive 2003/87 that that sector has an especially large 
number of installations, of the order of 34 000, not only in terms of the emissions they 
produce but also in relation to the number of installations currently included in the 
scope of the directive, which is of the order of 10 000.  The inclusion of that sector in 
the scope of Directive 2003/87 would therefore have made the management of the 
allowance trading scheme more difficult and increased the administrative burden, so 
that the possibility that the functioning of the scheme would have been disturbed at 
the time of its implementation as a result of that inclusion cannot be excluded.  
Moreover, the Community legislature was able to take the view that the advantages of 
excluding the whole sector at the start of the implementation of the allowance trading 
scheme outweighed the advantages of including it for attaining the objective of Direc-
tive 2003/87.  It follows that the Community legislature has shown to the requisite 
legal standard that it made use of objective criteria to exclude the entire chemical 
sector from the scope of Directive 2003/87 in the first stage of implementation of the 
allowance trading scheme.”). 
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same quotas rules) but the Council of State ruled that if the principle of equal 
treatment implies to treat equally firms which are in the same situation and 
allows public authorities to treat differently firms which are in “objectively 
different situations”, it does not impose such a different treatment in the latter 
case.48  This is a classic position in French public law49 but not in European 
Union law where the case law of the ECJ leads to an obligation to treat dif-
ferently firms (or citizens)  that are in different situations from each other,50 
not to mention that the appraisal of what is an “objectively different situation” 
is…subjective.51  The non application of this EU rule (anyone puts in a dif-
ferent situation must be treated differently by any administrative body) 
clearly demonstrates that the French supreme administrative court controls 
the content of its constitutional principles in that case.  
III. DIVERGENT APPROACHES: THE EXAMPLE OF FREE SPEECH 
The Internet is one of those areas where it may be difficult to create an 
effective transnational administrative structure.  For the United States (U.S.), 
governmental regulation of the Internet is complicated by the fact that the 
First Amendment protection for freedom of expression is directly implicated, 
and the U.S. regards free expression differently than many other countries,52 
including France, England and Wales.   
The relationship between the Internet and free expression is undeniable.  
In its landmark decision in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,53 the 
United States Supreme Court characterized the Internet as “a vast platform 
from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience of millions of 
readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers.”54  The Court’s conclusions have 
been more than confirmed by subsequent developments.  From the revolu-
tions in the Middle East during the Arab Spring, to the assistance of political 
movements in the U.S. and elsewhere, the Internet has produced profound 
societal consequences.55  In Europe, for example, the Pirate Party has used 
the Internet to organize and to capture seats in some European parliaments.56  
Similar results are evident worldwide.57 
  
 48. Id. 
 49. See CE, Mar. 28, 1997, Rec. Lebon 114 (Fr.). 
 50. See Case C-394/96, Brown v. Rentokil Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I-04185. 
 51. The ECJ uses the expression “comparable situations” rather than “objectively 
different situations.”  Case C-366/99, Griesmar v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Fi-
nances et de l’Industrie, 2001 E.C.R. I-09383. 
 52. See U.S. Const. amend. I. 
 53. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 54. Id. at 853 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 55. See Weaver, supra note 7. 
 56. See Juergen Baetz, Pirate Party Makes a Raid on German Politics, Yahoo! 
News (Apr. 28, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/pirate-party-makes-raid-german-
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The relationship between the Internet and free expression creates enor-
mous difficulties for transnational regulation.  In the area of free speech, the 
U.S. law approach differs significantly from the approach of other nations, 
particularly France and the EU.  As a result, even if U.S. officials wanted to 
heed past President Sarkozy’s call for greater regulation of the Internet, it 
might be difficult for them to find common ground, and difficult to create a 
constitutionally permissible structure.   
A. The U.S. Approach to Free Expression 
In the United States, the right to free speech has always been treated as a 
“preferred” right58 in the sense that the right to free expression often trumps 
other competing interests.59  Even though some justices have argued that 
freedom of speech is “absolute,”60 and should not be “balanced” against other 
rights and interests,61 the United State Supreme Court has consistently re-
jected the idea of “free speech absolutism.”  Balancing the right to free ex-
pression against other societal interests, the Court has held that the govern-
ment may prohibit child pornography,62 as well as obscenity,63 and can also 
restrict the sale of pornography to minors.64   
Even though the right to free expression is not regarded as “absolute” in 
the United States, the U.S. cuts the balance between speech and other societal 
interests in favor of free expression, and other nations cut the balance quite 
differently.   
  
politics-121746168.html (“[P]olls show [the Pirate Party] as the country’s third-
strongest political force, leapfrogging over more established parties.”). 
 57. See Weaver, supra note 7. 
 58. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992); Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). 
 59. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (holding that free-
dom of expression trumps the plaintiff’s claim that he suffered mental distress from 
protests at his son’s funeral); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396 (holding that freedom of ex-
pression precludes criminal conviction for hate-type speech); Hustler Magazine, Inc. 
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding that freedom of expression trumps the 
plaintiff’s claim that he suffered intentional infliction of mental and emotional dis-
tress). 
 60. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., 
concurring) (“Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view 
that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censor-
ship, injunctions, or prior restraints.”); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
First Amendment provides that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press.’ That leaves, in my view, no room for governmental 
restraint on the press.” (alteration in original)). 
 61. Id. at 723-24 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 62. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982). 
 63. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973). 
 64. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642 (1968). 
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B. The French Approach to Free Expression 
France provides an interesting contrast to the United States.  Under the 
1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, France 
explicitly recognizes that people have “natural rights” that give them freedom 
of action,65 and requires tolerance of others who exercise those rights,66 but 
the Declaration allows French society to restrict the exercise of rights when 
the individual’s exercise of those rights intrudes upon the rights of others to 
enjoy their rights.67  French law explicitly recognizes that people have “natu-
ral rights” that require governmental tolerance of individual freedom,68 but 
French law allows society to restrict the exercise of rights when there is an 
intrusion on the right of others to enjoy their rights.69  Although French law 
explicitly recognizes the right to freedom of expression, it also provides that 
free speech is subject to restriction in order to prevent “abuse.”70   
France has also adopted the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR), and the ECHR has had a pro-free speech effect on French law.  For 
example, even though the Council of State upheld a 1977 law that prohibited 
public opinion polls one week prior to political elections,71 the Cour de cassa-
tion, the supreme civil and criminal Court in France, reached the opposite 
result in 2001when it dismissed a criminal prosecution against a journalist 
who violated the law during the 1997 legislative elections. The Cour con-
cluded that the law was contrary to the ECHR article on freedom of expres-
sion.72  More recently, the French Constitutional Council struck down a re-
cently-enacted law that permitted prosecution of those who denied the exis-
tence of genocides recognized by law.73  The ruling, focused on free expres-
sion as enshrined in the 1789 declaration of human rights (which is part of the 
  
 65. French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, art. IV (“Liberty 
consists of doing anything which does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natu-
ral rights of each man has only those borders which assure other members of the soci-
ety the enjoyment of these same rights.  These borders can be determined only by the 
law.”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. at art. XI (“Any man being presumed innocent until he is declared culpa-
ble, if it is judged indispensable to arrest him, any rigor which would not be necessary 
for the securing of his person must be severely reprimanded by the law.”). 
 71. CE, June 2, 1999, Rec. Lebon p. 161 
 72. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Sept. 4, 2001, 
No. 00-85239 (Fr.). 
 73. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2012-




Weaver et al.: Weaver: Creation of Transnational
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: WeaverPaginated.docx Created on:  10/29/13 9:59 PM Last Printed: 11/20/13 6:11 PM 
538 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
 
French Constitution), as well as on the idea that a legislator is incompetent to 
declare that a genocide has been committed such as the Armenian genocide of 
1915.74  
Despite the moderating impact of the ECHR, the U.S. and Europe would 
probably reach different results on speech that adversely affects national se-
curity interests.  Article 10, Section 2, of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), provides for an array of restrictions on freedom of expres-
sion.  However, the ECHR also provides protection for freedom of expres-
sion, but places significant restrictions on that right.  The ECHR states that 
the right is 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.75 
In other words, both France and the ECHR seem to permit significant restric-
tions on freedom of expression. 
C.  English Free Speech Law 
In the English common law, free speech, or in European terminology, 
freedom of expression, is a long-established right in the English common 
law.76 Whilst civil liberties have traditionally been vulnerable to the interven-
tion of legislation enacted by a Parliament, which comes imbued with Parlia-
mentary sovereignty, commentators have nevertheless asserted that freedom 
  
 74. This law led to diplomatic issues between Turkey and France before the 
ruling of the Constitutional council as the law of  January 29, 2001 declared that Tur-
key had committed a genocide towards Armenians in 1915.  Turkey PM Says French 
Bill on Genocide Denial “Racist”, BBC News (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www 
.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16695133. 
 75. European Convention on Human Rights, art. X  (“The exercise of these free-
doms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such for-
malities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are neces-
sary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the dis-
closure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.”). 
 76. J. Beatson et al., supra note 25, ¶ 1.09. 
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of expression has a “special status.”77  Some examples of the common law 
protection of this right may be offered.  In developing the law of defamation 
in the case of Derbyshire CC v Times Newspaper Ltd,78 the House of Lords 
referred to the fundamental right to freedom of expression in the common law 
and held that a local authority should not as such be able to sue for libel. 
However, in the later case of Wainwright v Home Office, Lord 
Hoffmann described Derbyshire CC as merely recognizing “freedom of 
speech” as an “underlying value which supported the decision to lay down the 
specific rule that a local authority could not sue for libel.”79  He went on to 
argue that “no one has suggested that freedom of speech is in itself a legal 
principle which is capable of sufficient definition to enable one to deduce 
specific rules to be applied in concrete cases.  That is not the way the com-
mon law works.”80 
Given the inherent weaknesses of the common law approach, the incor-
poration of the ECHR by means of the HRA 1998 was thus a significant act 
from the perspective of the protection of the freedom of expression. Stras-
bourg has frequently emphasized the importance of these foundational rights:  
Freedom of expression is “one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society and one of the basic conditions for its progress.”81 The direct applica-
tion of Article 10 ECHR enshrining of the freedom of expression into English 
law is therefore important, providing for a concrete and defined right, and 
allowing inter alia for a framework for evaluating purported restrictions on 
the freedom of expression.  The right is thus not absolute, and exceptions are 
countenanced, but limitations may only occur if they are (a) are prescribed by 
law; (b) pursue a legitimate aim; and (c) are “necessary in a democratic soci-
ety.” 
IV. THE PROSPECTS FOR TRANSNATIONAL AGREEMENT AND 
REGULATION OF THE INTERNET 
In an Article of this length, it is difficult to discuss all of the areas where 
transnational regulation of the Internet might be sought, or all of the potential 
complications.  However, in the remaining pages, some of the potential areas 
for regulation will be discussed. 
  
 77. David Feldman, English Public Law ¶ 9.07 (2d ed. 2009). 
 78. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534 
(H.L.) 6. 
 79. Wainwright v. Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53 (H.L.), ¶  31. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 737, 754 (1976). 
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A.  Regulation of Commercial Speech. 
The beginning of this Article focused on the growing level of commerce 
between nations.  As the Internet has grown in significance, there have been 
major increases in the quantity of products advertised over the Internet.  This 
is one area of the law where there is significant potential for regulation and 
substantial room for the creation of transnational regulatory structures.  For 
example, a transnational regulatory regime could regulate and prosecute 
fraudulent and deceptive commercial speech. 
However, even with commercial speech, there are potential constitu-
tional conflicts.  The United States Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the 
First Amendment as protecting, not only political speech, but also commer-
cial speech.82  Despite this protection, the U.S. government may prohibit 
speech that is illegal or fraudulent.83  However, there are definite limits on the 
government’s ability to control the non-fraudulent sale of legal products, in-
cluding prescription drugs,84 lawyer services,85 tobacco,86 and alcohol.87  Be-
cause many of the problems requiring transnational attention relate to com-
merce and the sale of goods, this obstacle is a potentially significant one 
which will undoubtedly limit the ability of treaty negotiators to craft an ex-
pansive treaty  and ultimately limit the scope of authority that a transnational 
administrative structure can exercise. 
One area of “commerce” that has grown significantly in recent years is 
Internet gambling.  Not only is online gambling big business, but it frequently 
crosses international boundaries.88  To the extent that Internet gambling is 
illegal,89 it can be severely regulated.  However, legislative support for a ban 
is waning light of the budget crisis and the search for additional revenues.90  
  
 82. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554-54 (2001); Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 
(1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
770 (1976).  
 83. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.  
 84. Id. at 773. 
 85. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995); Shapero v. Ky. 
Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988). 
 86. See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 553-54. 
 87. See 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996).  
 88. See Eric Pfanner, Is Party Over for Internet Gambling? – Technology – In-
ternational Herald Tribune, N.Y. Times (July 2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2006/07/02/technology/02iht-gamble03.2100660.html?pagewanted=all. 
 89. See Sewell Chan, Congress Rethinks its Ban on Internet Gambling, N.Y. 
Times (July 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com.com/2010/07/29/us/politics 
/29gamble.html. 
 90. Id. 
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States are also seeking additional revenues.91  As a result, this is an area 
where transnational structures might be of great use as a way to regulate the 
industry and to make sure that it operates fairly.  If Internet gambling is legal-
ized, treaty negotiators may face some limitations on their ability to create 
transnational structures, but should be able to create effective transnational 
regulation.  
B.  Regulating Child Pornography. 
Another area where transnational regulation is possible is with regard to 
child pornography.  Because the U.S. Constitution allows the government to 
prohibit “child pornography,” it would be possible to create an administrative 
structure to regulate and control the transmission of such pornography over 
the Internet.92   In addition, this is an area of the law where transnational 
regulation would be quite beneficial since the Web helps pornographers send 
child pornography across international borders.93 
The only complication is that there is a curious little wrinkle in U.S. law 
that allows the government to regulate “actual” child pornography, but not 
“virtual” child pornography.94  In other words, child pornography can only be 
banned when it depicts actual children involved in sexual activities, but not 
when it involves only computer depictions of children involved in such ac-
tivities.95  As a result, U.S. treaty negotiators will be forced to recognize and 
acknowledge this distinction in consenting to U.S. participation in a transna-
tional regulatory structure. 
C.  Regulating Obscenity. 
Transnational regulation might also be permissible with regard to ob-
scenity.  U.S. law also permits restrictions on obscenity, and obscenity gener-
ates very substantial amounts of international commerce.96   
  
 91. See Michael Cooper, As States Weigh Online Gambling, Profit May Be 
Small, N.Y. Times (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/us/more-
states-look-to-legalize-online-gambling.html. 
 92. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982). 
 93. See Gretchen Ruethling, 27 Charged in International Child Pornography 
Ring, N.Y. Times (Mar. 16, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/16/national 
/16porn.html. 
 94. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002) (explaining that 
“virtual child pornography” is defined as pictures of children involved in sexual ac-
tivities that involve solely computer generated images, and that do not involve actual 
children). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Brad Stone, An E-Commerce Empire, From Porn to Puppies, N.Y. Times 
(May 18, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/technology/18gordo.html 
?pagewanted=all. 
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The only major difficulty is that the U.S. draws a clear line of demarca-
tion between obscenity, which derives no constitutional protection, and other 
sexual images which may be protected.97  However, the U.S. has had trouble 
defining the term “obscenity.”98  As a result, if international negotiators can 
agree on a suitable definition of “obscenity,” this is an area where transna-
tional regulation is possible.  The major difficulty is that U.S. law may be a 
bit prudish regarding sexual images, at least compared to the attitudes of 
many Western European countries, and this cultural difference might cause 
the United States to seek greater restrictions than Europeans might find ac-
ceptable.  Nevertheless, U.S. law would not be an impediment to an agree-
ment as long as all that is prohibited is material that is deemed obscene under 
U.S. law. 
D. Regulation of Speech Related to Holocaust Denial and Degradation 
of Human Dignity.99   
There might be substantial impediments if the transnational regulatory 
structure were to have authority over speech involving Holocaust denial or 
degradation of human dignity.  In this area, there is a major divide between 
the U.S. and some European countries.  France has enacted the Gayssot law 
which makes it a crime to deny the existence of the Holocaust and also makes 
it a crime to challenge the findings of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribu-
nal.100  Also, many European countries permit restrictions on hate speech, 
usually with an eye towards protecting human dignity and promoting other 
values such as equality.101  For reasons that will be explained below, this will 
be an area in which there will be limited leeway for the U.S. to agree to inter-
national regulation. 
The French Holocaust denial law is regarded as a necessary limit on 
freedom of speech for several reasons.  First, the law protects Holocaust vic-
tims’ and their families’ fundamental right to human dignity, and provides for 
  
 97. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973). 
 98. Id. at 22. 
 99. This section was largely modeled after Russell L. Weaver, Nicolas Delpierre  
& Laurence Boissier, Holocaust Denial and Governmentally Declared “Truth”: 
French and American Perspectives, 41 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 495, 499-504, 508-09, 512-
15 (2009).   
 100. See Law 90-615 of July 13, 1990, art. 9, Journal Officiel de la République 
Franaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 14, 1990, p. 8333. 
 101. The right to human dignity receives explicit protection under French law.  
See Loi 2000-916 29 juillet 1881 [Law 2000-916 of July 29, 1881], Journal Officiel 
de la République Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 29, 1881, art. 35.  
It is also protected under European treaty.  See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 1(a), 
Dec. 13, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ 
/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF.   
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a 15,000 Euro fine for publication of a document that causes serious damage 
to a victim’s dignity that is published without the victim’s approval.102  Al-
though the human dignity law does not specifically prohibit statements deny-
ing the Holocaust, the law’s reasoning suggests that freedom of speech may 
be limited when it conflicts with a crime victim’s right to dignity.  One can 
argue that the Gayssot law protects the dignity of Holocaust victims and their 
families by prohibiting statements contesting, denigrating, even denying the 
existence of “crimes against humanity.”  Second, the Gayssot law is regarded 
as necessary to maintain public order given disturbances that have resulted 
when the circumstances of the Holocaust have been called into question, and 
given the tensions that such attitudes can spark between ethnic communi-
ties.103  Third, the Gayssot law is regarded as justified given that the Nazis 
deported Jews from France during the Occupation, and there is a fear that 
France will forget the events of World War II as survivors grow old or died. 
The Gayssot Law has been interpreted and applied in a very repressive 
way.  For example, Bruno Gollnisch, a member of the European Parliament 
and the then number three official in the National Front, was criminally 
prosecuted and convicted for making a variety of statements in the wake of a 
commission’s finding that there were Holocaust deniers at the University of 
Lyon.104  It was initially alleged that Gollnisch had publicly contested the 
neutrality of the findings in a press conference at the National Front's Lyon 
headquarters.105  Le Figaro reported that Gollnisch made the following state-
ments at the press conference: “Henry Rousso [the Chairman of the Commis-
sion] is a committed historian, he is a Jewish person, someone highly respect-
able, but there is no assurance of his being neutral.”106  
In various interviews, Gollnisch acknowledged that his own specialty 
was Japanese history and Asian-Pacific matters during World War II rather 
  
 102. Loi 2000-916 29 juillet 1881 [Law 2000-916 of July 29, 1881], Journal Offi-
ciel de la République Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 29, 1881, art. 
35.   
 103. The Conseil d’Etat has held that an individual’s “dignity is one of the many 
components of public order.”  CE, Oct. 27, 1995, Rec. Lebon 372 (holding that 
dwarves right to dignity precluded them from choosing whether to allow themselves 
to be “launched” into the air). 
 104. Olivier Bertrand, Pour les Juges, Gollnisch est Negationniste, Liberation 
(Jan. 19, 2007), http://www.liberation.fr/societe/010191474-pour-les-juges-gollnisch-
est-negationniste; Bruno Gollnisch (FN) Condamne pour ses ‘Insinuations’ sur les 
Chambres a Gaz, Le Monde, Jan. 20, 2007, at 11. 
 105. See Aisha Labi, French Professor Faces Suspension for Comments About the 
Holocaust, Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 29, 2004, http://chronicle.com/article/French-
Professor-Faces/25749/. 
 106. Olivier Pognon, Négationnisme: Gollnisch Relance la Polémique, Le Figaro, 
Oct. 11, 2004, cited in Gilles Karmasyn, Les Déclarations de Bruno Gollnisch Sont 
Implicitement, mais sans Ambiguïté, Négationnistes, Pratique de l’Histoire et 
Dévoiements Négationnistes, http://www.phdn.org/negation/gollnisch2004.html. 
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than European history.107  Moreover, although Gollnisch made it clear that 
“he did not contest the drama of the concentration camps,” he did claim that 
he was “entitled to discuss the issue freely” and to “discuss the actual number 
of people killed.”108  Gollnisch said, “I want things to be clear, as far as I am 
concerned, I do not deny the existence of homicidal gas chambers,” and “I'll 
not question the existence of concentration camps, but on the issue of the 
number of people killed, historians should be left free to discuss it. As for the 
existence of gas chambers, it is up to historians to decide.”109  Many of Goll-
nisch's comments on the Holocaust seemed to focus on the importance of 
academic freedom and the ability of historians to discuss such matters.  In the 
days after the press conference, Gollnisch made similar statements.  For ex-
ample, when asked in an interview whether he contested the existence of gas 
chambers, Gollnisch declared that “this is a matter for historians to discuss” 
and flatly stated “that historians do not agree.”110 
The court found Gollnisch guilty of the offense of “orally contesting the 
existence of crimes against humanity,”111 and imposed a three-month sus-
pended prison sentence, a 5,000 euro fine, ordered him to pay for the court 
decision to be published in newspapers, and ordered that he pay 55,000 euros 
in damages to nine different plaintiffs.112  In addition, he was suspended from 
his professorial post at the University of Lyons for five years.113  The court 
held that Gollnisch resorted to “disguising devices, insinuating doubts, con-
trary to other negationists such as Robert Faurisson or Roger Garaudy who 
expressed themselves openly.”114  On February 28, 2008, the Lyon Court of 
  
 107. See France Mulls Ways To Sanction Holocaust Doubter, Radio Islam (Oct. 
15, 2004), http://www.radioislam.org/gollnisch/eng.htm. 
 108. Christophe Forcari, Dix-Sept Ans Aprés son Leader, le Numero 2 du FN Met 
en Doute leur Existence, Liberation, Oct. 12, 2004, at 12; see Sophia Landrin, Bruno 
Gollnisch (FN) Emet des Doutes sur L’Existence des Chambres a Gaz et Relativise 
L’Ampleur de la Shoah, Le Monde (Oct. 13, 2004), www.lemonde.fr/cgi-
bin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre =ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_ 30J&objet 
_id=871971; Honor Mahony, French Far-Right MEP Fined for Holocaust Remarks, 
EU Observer (Jan. 19, 2007), http://euobserver.com/9/23301/?rk=1; French Minister 
Orders Probe Into Politician’s Holocaust Remarks (Radio France Internationale radio 
broadcast Nov. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Radio France Internationale]. 
 109. See sources cited supra note 93. 
 110. Bruno Gollnisch Maintient ses Propos Juges Negationnistes, Le Nouvel Ob-
servateur, Oct. 12, 2004. 
 111. Bertrand, supra note 89; Bruno Gollnisch (FN) Condamne pour ses ‘Insinua-
tions’ sur les Chambres a Gaz, supra note 89. 
 112. Bertrand, supra note 89; Bruno Gollnisch (FN) Condamne pour ses ‘Insinua-
tions' sur les Chambres a Gaz, supra note 89. 
 113. See French Far-Right Leader To Appeal, BBC News (Jan. 19, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6277983.stm. 
 114. Bertrand, supra note 89; Bruno Gollnisch (FN) Condamne pour ses ‘Insinua-
tions' sur les Chambres a Gaz, supra note 89.. 
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Appeal confirmed the decision.115  However, the Cour de cassation over-
turned the ruling, holding that there was no evidence of such a denial.116 
It is difficult to believe that Gollnisch could have been successfully 
prosecuted in the United States for making similar statements had a similar 
law existed in the United States.  Gollnisch’s comments about the chairman 
of the commission would likely have been regarded as nothing more than 
political comment in the United States, and therefore they would have been 
regarded as protected political expression.  Moreover, most of his statements 
about the Holocaust fell short of an outright denial that the Holocaust oc-
curred.  With minor exceptions, U.S. law does not permit the government to 
declare “truth” or to demand that everyone accept officially declared truths.117    
The United States’ aversion to governmental censorship is summed up 
by one American commentator who noted that, “an unregulated marketplace 
of ideas is preferable to government restrictions on freedom of expression, 
not because the marketplace of ideas is efficient and always leads to benign 
results, but because the alternative of government regulation is far worse.”118  
As a general rule, governmental officials are precluded from requiring that 
everyone adhere to certain beliefs or ideals.119  As the United States Supreme 
Court recognized in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,120 
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no offi-
cial, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, national-
ism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word 
  
 115. La Condamnation de Bruno Gollnisch Confirmee en Appel, Le Figaro (Feb. 
28, 2008), available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2008/02/28/01002-
20080228ARTFIG00480-la-condamnation-de-bruno-gollnisch-confirmee-en-
appel.php. 
 116. Cass. Crim. 23 June 2009, n° 08-82521 http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affich Juri-
Judi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000020821426 
 117. See Weaver, Delpierre & Boissier, supra note 12, at 512-15.   
 118. David E. Bernstein, Defending the First Amendment from Antidiscrimina-
tion Laws, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 223, 223 (2003). 
 119. See, e.g., W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1943) 
(“Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought essen-
tial to their time and country have been waged by many good as well as by evil men . 
. . .  As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more 
bitter as to whose unity it shall be.  Probably no deeper division of our people could 
proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine 
and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in em-
bracing.  Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every 
such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan 
unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as 
a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian 
enemies.  Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves ex-
terminating dissenters.  Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanim-
ity of the graveyard.”). 
 120. Id.  
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or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an ex-
ception, they do not now occur to us.”121 
Likewise, although many European countries permit restrictions on hate 
speech, usually with an eye towards protecting human dignity and promoting 
other values such as equality,122 U.S. decisions have generally been hostile to 
hate speech restrictions.123  In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,124 a porno-
graphic magazine printed a parody portraying a religious/political figure as 
having engaged in an incestuous relationship with his mother in an out-
house.125  The Court applied First Amendment free speech principles to hold 
that the plaintiff could not recover for intentional infliction of mental and 
emotional distress.126  Likewise, in Snyder v. Phelps,127 members of a funda-
mentalist religious group picketed at the funeral of a deceased military vet-
eran who was killed in Iraq.128  At the funeral, protestors held signs with mes-
sages such as “God Hates You,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “Thank God 
For Dead Soldiers.”129  The Court held that the father could not recover from 
the protestors for intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress.130  
The Court held that the speech related to matters of public interest and debate, 
and could not be suppressed simply because the protestor’s views were objec-
tionable or distressing to the soldier’s father.131 
By contrast, restrictions have been made in the UK so as to criminalize 
hate speech. The Public Order Act 1986 makes it an offence for a person to 
use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior that causes, or is 
likely to cause, another person harassment, alarm or distress.132  The Racial 
and Religious Hatred Act in 1996 amended the POA to make it an offence 
punishable by up to seven years imprisonment to use threatening words or 
behavior intended to stir up religious hatred,133 and the Terrorism Act 2006 
criminalizes the “encouragement of terrorism’ which includes making state-
ments that glorify terrorist acts, and is punishable by up to seven years im-
prisonment.134  
  
 121. Id. at 642. 
 122. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 123. See e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Dawson v. Dela-
ware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992). 
 124. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 125. Id. at 48. 
 126. Id. at 50-57. 
 127. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 128. Id. at 1212. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 1219. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, § 18 (U.K.). 
 133. Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, c. 1, § 1, 29B, 29L (U.K.). 
 134. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.). 
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E.  Regulation of Nazi Symbols. 
In theory, transnational regulation could also extend to regulation of 
prohibited symbols.  For example, many European countries make it a crime 
to display Nazi symbols, or to march in Nazi uniforms.  However, if the U.S. 
were to participate, it is not clear that a transnational administrative structure 
could be given the power to prohibit such symbols from the Internet.  Al-
though the United States Supreme Court has not definitively resolved the 
issue, its existing case law suggests that the First Amendment prohibits the 
U.S. government from criminalizing displays of Nazi regalia, advocacy of 
Nazi ideas, or even Nazi marches.135 
F.  Regulation of Speech Regarding National Symbols. 
Another area where Internet regulation would be difficult is regarding 
governmental attempts to protect national symbols.  In reliance on the ECHR, 
France has exercised the power to restrict free speech in order to maintain 
public order.136  Pursuant to that authority, France has enacted a law (Loi 
pour la Sécurité Intérieure) prohibiting individuals from holding the French 
national flag or the French national anthem in contempt.137  In upholding this 
law, the Conseil Constitutionnel held that lawmakers did not transgress the 
necessary balance “between the protection of public order and the protection 
of the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution”138  
By contrast, the U.S. First Amendment protects individuals who choose 
to desecrate the U.S. flag.  In Texas v. Johnson,139 the Court struck down a 
law prohibiting the burning of a U.S. flag while stating that the State’s inter-
est in “preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity” can-
not justify  a “criminal conviction for engaging in political expression.” 140  
Presumably, U.S. treaty negotiators also could not agree to a treaty prohibit-
ing the denigration of French or other nation’s symbols to the extent that the 
action is taken on U.S. soil. 
  
 135. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam); Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per curiam); Village of Skokie v. Nat’l Social-
ist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 25-26 (Ill. 1978) (per curiam).  
 136. Weaver, Delpierre & Boissier, supra note 12, at 507-08. 
 137. Code pénal [C. pén.] art. 433-5-1 (Fr.). 
 138. Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2003-
467DC, Mar. 13, 2003, J.O. 4789 (Fr.). 
 139. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 140. Id. at 420. 
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G.  Regulating of Speech Affecting National Security Interests.   
There may also be limits on the ability of a transnational administrative 
structure to regulate or limit speech affecting national security interests.  In 
Europe, there is much broader authority to protect such interests.  Article 10, 
Section 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), provides 
for an array of restrictions on freedom of expression:  
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, re-
strictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in 
a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals. . .141   
The U.S. Constitution has been interpreted as providing the U.S. gov-
ernment with relatively more limited authority to regulate speech affecting 
national security interests.  In New York Times Co. v. United States,142 the 
government tried to prevent newspapers from publishing stolen classified 
government documents (referred to as “The Pentagon Papers”).143  The Court 
treated the lower court injunction as a prior restraint against speech, held that 
any prior restraint “comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against 
its constitutional validity,” and that the government “carries a heavy burden 
of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.”144  The Court 
held that the government had failed to satisfy that burden even though the 
government claimed that release of the reports would have had an adverse 
impact on national security interests.145  
H.  Regulating Speech Advocating Illegal Action. 
It may also be difficult to regulate speech that attempts to incite or pro-
mote illegal action.  In this area of the law, there is tension between the gov-
ernment’s desire to intervene against crime early, through crimes such as 
conspiracy and attempt, and the societal interest in freedom of expression.  
The United States Supreme Court has also issued other decisions that proba-
bly would have been decided differently under French protections against 
degradation of human dignity, as well as under the ECHR which permits 
greater regulation of speech in order to protect national security.  Branden-
  
 141. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10, § 2. 
 142. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 143. Id. at 714. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. 
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burg v. Ohio,146 involved Klu Klux Klan members who held a rally dressed in 
Klan regalia, burned a large cross at the rally, and talked about taking “re-
vengeance” (sic) on behalf of the Caucasian race.147  The Court held that the 
activities were protected against prosecution unless it could be shown that the 
Klan members intended to incite imminent lawless conduct, and were likely 
to cause imminent lawless conduct.148  
I.  Regulatory Protection of Privacy Interests. 
Privacy is another issue where there may be interest in transnational 
administrative regulation of the Internet, but it is another area whether there is 
significant divergence between the U.S. and Europe.  Europe, in general, is 
more protective of privacy than the United States, and is considerably more 
willing to allow that right to trump the right to freedom of expression.  The 
European Convention on Human Rights has a special provision that guaran-
tees the “right to respect of the private and family life.” which contains two 
subparts:  
1) Everybody has a right to have his private and family life re-
spected, as well as his place of residence and correspondence. 
2) There can be no interference of a public authority in the exercise 
of this right, except if this inference is legal and is a measure that, 
in a democracy, is necessary for the protection of national security, 
public safety, economic well-being of the State, defense of the 
public order and prevention of criminal infringements, protection 
of the health and ethics, or for the protection of the rights and free-
dom of other people.149 
Even though Germany’s constitution (the Basic Law) provides explicit 
constitutional protection for personality,150 the ECHR provision has been 
construed as being more protective of privacy than the German provision.  In 
a case involving Princess Caroline of Monaco and paparazzi who were taking 
pictures of her while she was in public places, German courts refused to hold 
that the paparazzi had violated Caroline’s rights.  The European Court of 
Human Rights disagreed, applying ECHR section 8,151 and holding that Prin-
  
 146. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 147. Id. at 445-46. 
 148. Id. at 447. 
 149. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8. 
 150. See Ellen S. Bass, A Right in Search of a Coherent Rationale – Conceptualiz-
ing Persona in a Comparative Context: The United States Right of Publicity and Ger-
man Personality Rights, 42 U.S.F. L. Rev. 799, 830-31 (2008). 
 151. See 1A Lindey on Entertainment, Publ. & the Arts § 3:11.30 (3d ed.). 
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cess Caroline was entitled to some privacy protections even when she ap-
peared in public.152 
U.S. privacy law is of relatively recent origin and is traced to a seminal 
article written by Samuel Warren and Justice Louis D. Brandeis.153  Under the 
modern formulation, the tort of privacy has four separate and distinct causes 
of action: 1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into private 
affairs; 2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 
3) publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and 4) 
appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness for the defendant's advan-
tage.154  
In the United States, it is extremely doubtful that a public figure like 
Princess Caroline could use the tort of privacy to halt the publication of simi-
lar photographs.  The First Amendment interest in publication of true infor-
mation, especially of events that occur in public places, is too great.  As a 
result, a media outlet could not be required to pay damages for revealing the 
name of a rape victim despite a statutory prohibition against disclosure.155  
Even in false light privacy cases, in which plaintiff is portrayed in a “false 
light” in the public eye, the Court has required plaintiff to show that defen-
dant published with “actual malice” (in the sense that it knew that the publi-
cation was false or acted in reckless disregard for truth or falsity).156 
Despite the divergence between the U.S. and Europe on scenarios like 
the Princess Caroline case, there are a number of areas where cooperation 
between the U.S. and other countries should be possible in terms of the treaty 
negotiations.  U.S. courts would probably uphold appropriately drafted re-
strictions on paparazzi that are designed to halt harassment.  Illustrative is the 
lower court holding in Galella v. Onassis157 in which the paparazzi was en-
joined from certain types of behavior (although he was not enjoined from 
  
 152. Von Hannover v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2004), available at 2004 WL 
1808843. 
 153. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 
4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).  In their article, Warren and Brandeis forcefully articu-
lated the need to protect “privacy.”  Id. at 195-96. 
 154. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960). 
 155. See, e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).  In this case, a 
newspaper asked the Court “to hold broadly that truthful publication may never be 
punished consistently with the First Amendment.”  Id. at 532.  The Court declined, 
saying that “the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes be-
tween First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that 
sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the [particular] case.”  Id. at 
533.  The Florida Star case concerned a state statute that made it unlawful to “‘print, 
publish or broadcast . . . in any instrument of mass communication’ the name of a 
victim of a sexual offense.”  Id. at 526. 
 156. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387 (1967). 
 157. 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 487 F.2d 986 
(2d Cir. 1973). 
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photographing Ms. Onassis in public).158   In the United States, it might also 
be possible to gain judicial protection for one’s name and likeness,159 to pro-
tect against someone who intruded into plaintiff’s seclusion, or against some-
one who tries to appropriate plaintiff’s intellectual property.160 
So, in the final analysis, there is some room for U.S. negotiators to agree 
to restrictions on Internet speech that affects privacy, but the U.S. ability to 
enter such agreements may be limited by constitutional concerns.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Some prominent world leaders have called for international regulation 
of the Internet.  Undoubtedly, these leaders correctly recognize that, if Inter-
net regulation is to be effective, there must be international cooperation.  
Transnational regulatory structures are also necessary.  Internet communica-
tions frequently cross international borders, and no single nation is capable of 
dealing with Internet crime entirely on its own.  Child pornography might 
originate in one part of the world (e.g., Asia), be transmitted to another part of 
the word (e.g., Europe), and be retransmitted to yet another part of the world 
(e.g., the Americas).161  A single country will be unable to investigate such 
far-flung activities by itself, much less to apprehend the perpetrators and 
bring them to justice.  Moreover, transnational administrative structures could 
help nations develop regulatory standards and enforcement structures. 
Even though international cooperation is need, the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution will inevitably restrict the ability of U.S. treaty 
negotiators to negotiate an international treaty governing the Internet, and 
their ability to agree to transnational regulatory structures governing the In-
  
 158. Id. at 241. 
 159. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 731-32 (S.D.N.Y.1978); East-
wood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal Ct. App. 1983). 
 160. See Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).  In this 
case, an entertainer who performed a “human cannonball” act in which he was shot 
from a cannon into a net some 200 yards away performed his act in a fair ground 
surrounded by grandstands.  Id. at 563-64.  A reporter filmed the act and showed it on 
the news.  Id.  The entertainer sued for damages claiming that the station unlawfully 
appropriated his property.  Id. at 564.  The news station claimed that it was immune 
from suit under the First Amendment.  Id. at 564-65.  The Supreme Court disagreed.  
Id. at 565-66. 
 161. See Nina Bernstein, Inmate Accused of Collecting Internet Child Pornogra-
phy, N.Y. Times (Mar. 28, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/28/us/inmate-
accused-of-collecting-internet-child-pornography.html (“The two-count indictment 
says that as early as January 1994, while he was a prisoner at the Minnesota Correc-
tional Facility at Lino Lakes, Mr. Chamberlain used a prison computer and the Inter-
net to obtain child pornography, used E-mail through an anonymous remailing service 
in Finland to discuss with others how to avoid detection, and possessed an optical 
disk containing 287 visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct.”). 
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ternet.  U.S. negotiators should have no difficulty agreeing to certain types of 
provisions.  For example, U.S. negotiators could agree to criminalize child 
pornography, obscenity (assuming that they can agree on a workable defini-
tion of the term “obscenity”), and various types of fraudulent schemes.  In 
addition, U.S. negotiators can commit the U.S. government, including and 
especially police and prosecutors, to work with other governments to appre-
hend and punish those who engage in such activities.   
U.S. negotiators may be constitutionally prohibited from agreeing to 
criminalize certain other types of conduct.  Despite the possible importance to 
European nations, U.S. negotiators may not be able to agree to prohibit Inter-
net speech involving Holocaust denial or the display of Nazi insignias or 
symbols, and they could not accept some of the broad and general speech 
provisions articulated in the European Convention on Human Rights.  Finally, 
because U.S. defamation law differs so radically from that of other countries, 
U.S. negotiators could not accept British demands to cut the balance between 
speech and reputation more decisively in terms of reputation, and (assuming 
that the lower court decisions hold up over time) could not agree to have U.S. 
courts enforce foreign (especially British) defamation judgments.  U.S. public 
policy can and should preclude enforcement of such judgments. 
Thus, while there are possible avenues for U.S. cooperation in terms of a 
treaty governing the Internet, U.S. negotiators will need to tread lightly in 
order to ensure that they do not transgress the boundaries established by the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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